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Abstract
Five attributes of emission generating technologies are identied and a concept of by-
production is introduced, which implies these ve attributes. Murty and Russell [2010]
characterization of technologies, which requires distinguishing between intended produc-
tion of rms and nature's laws of emission generation, is shown to be both necessary and
sucient for by-production. While intended production could be postulated to satisfy
standard input and output free-disposability, these will necessarily be violated by nature's
emission generation mechanism, which satises costly disposability of emission as dened
in Murty [2010]. Marginal technical and economic costs of abatement are derived for tech-
nologies exhibiting by-production. A simple model of by-production illustrates that, while
common abatement paths considered in the literature do involve a technological trade-
o between emission reduction and intended production, there also almost always exist
abatement paths where it is possible to have both greater emission reductions and greater
intended outputs. Further, marginal abatement costs will usually be decreasing in the
initial level of emissions of rms. Counterintuitive as these results may sound in the rst
instance, they are intuitively obvious in the by-production approach as it is rich enough
to incorporate both standard economic assumptions with respect to intended production
of rms and the rules of nature that govern emission generation.
Keywords: theory of a rm, technology, input and output free-disposability, diminishing
returns to inputs, joint production, emission-generation, marginal abatement cost.On the theory of a 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On the theory of a rm: The case of by-production of emissions
by Sushama Murty
1. Introduction.
What are the essential attributes of the process of emission generation by rms when
they engage in the production of their intended outputs?
Firstly, in nature, there are certain goods that cause emissions under certain physical
conditions. If, in the process of their intended production, rms create such conditions and
employ these emission causing goods as inputs or produce these emission causing goods as
their intended outputs, then they trigger-o the nature's emission generating mechanism
and generate emissions as by-products or incidental outputs of their intended production.1
Secondly, a distinction needs to be made between inputs of emission generation and
inputs of intended production. The emission causing inputs used by a rm in its intended
production or the emission causing intended outputs produced by a rm are the inputs of
emission generation. They have a special property: they exhibit non-rivalness or jointness
in emission generation and intended production: the use of such inputs to produce intended
outputs does not reduce their availability for emission generation, and the fact that some
intended outputs serve also as inputs of emission generation does not reduce the amounts
of such goods that the rms can oer for sale in markets.2
Thirdly, technologies of rms producing emissions as by-products do not satisfy free-
disposability of emissions3: for every given vector of the emission producing inputs used
by the rm or the emission producing outputs produced by the rm, there is a certain
minimal amount of emission that will always be generated. Technical ineciencies may
imply that the rm can be generating more (but not less) than this minimum amount of
emission.4 On the other hand, a given vector of inputs is also associated with a menu
of maximum possible combinations of intended outputs that are technologically feasible.
Technical eciencies may imply that the rm produces less (but not more) than these
ecient amounts of intended outputs.
Fourthly, all the above attributes may imply systematic correlations between emis-
sion generation and intended production. If emissions are generated by certain inputs of
1 For example, an emission causing input is coal. Emission of a strong odor can be caused by intended
outputs such as cheese of a dairy.
2 The same amount of coal produces both smoke and electricity. The fact that cheese produced by a
dairy is an input into production of strong odor (a by-product of the dairy) does not reduce the amount
of cheese that the dairy can sell.
3 Intuitively, a technology satises output free disposability if a given level of output is producible from
a given vector of inputs implies that any lower level of output is also producible from the same vector of
inputs. A technology satises input free disposability if a given level of input can produce a given vector
of outputs implies that any higher level of input can also produce the same vector of outputs. These
denitions allow for the possibility that rms can be operating technically ineciently.
4 Murty [2010] calls this \costly disposability" and provides two denitions of this term, one of which
is the polar opposite of the standard denition of free disposability of output employed in the literature.
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intended production, then increases in the use of these inputs by rms implies a greater
production of both emissions and the intended outputs.5 If emissions are generated by
certain intended outputs of the rm then, for a xed vector of all inputs, an increase in the
scale of production of these outputs (by diverting more of the inputs into their production)
leads to a greater generation of emissions and lower production of the remaining intended
outputs.6
Fifthly, by diverting some of their resources towards cleaning-up activities from pro-
duction of intended goods, rms can mitigate emission generation.7 But this comes at the
cost of lower production of intended goods.
Many of the emissions generated by rms impose external eects (benecial or detri-
mental) on the rest of the society. Eorts to reduce (increase) harmful (benecial) emis-
sions are often costly for the generators as they usually entail changing the protable scale
of their intended production activities. Hence, in the absence of additional incentives, the
generating rms will not voluntarily internalize, in their decisions, the external eects on
the rest of the society caused by by-products such as emissions that they produce.
A rst step in designing policies that provide incentives to rms to regulate the
generation of such by-products is a thorough understanding of the inextricable link between
emission generation and intended production. In the case of harmful emissions, such an
exercise delineates the various options available to rms to abate emission generation and
their associated costs. The aims of this paper are to provide an understanding of this link
and to identify and assess the costs of various abatement strategies available to rms.
The literature usually models emission generating technologies with the help of a
single production relation between inputs, intended outputs, and emissions.8 Such a pro-
duction relation is assumed to exhibit a positive relation between intended outputs and
emission generation. Such a positive relation is introduced either by bestowing the emis-
sion with properties of a standard input9 or by treating it as an output that possesses
5 Increases in coal used increases both the level of smoke produced and the level of electricity generated.
6 For a given amount of milk, an increase in cheese production implies increase in the amount of odor
generated and a decrease in the amount of butter produced by the dairy (as the use of the milk to produce
greater amount of the cheese decreases the amount of milk for producing butter).
7 Cleaning-up activities to reduce emissions generated include end-of pipe treatment plants, recycling,
etc.
8 See, e.g., the classic text in environmental economics by Baumol and Oates [1988] and Cropper and
Oates [1992].
9 For the input approach see, e.g., Baumol and Oates [1988] and Cropper and Oates [1992]. This is often
justied by considering the amount of the emission generated as a proxy for the amount of the assimilative
capacity of environmental resources such as air and water used to absorb it. However, a clear distinction
needs to be made between environmental resources, which denitely serve as inputs of emission generation,
and emission itself, which is an (incidental) output of production. A given environmental resource like air
can absorb dierent types of emissions like CO2, SO2, etc., and its assimilative capacity can be dierent
for dierent emissions. See Murty [2010] for this distinction. In this paper we do not model the use of
environmental resources as inputs of emission generation. However, see Footnote 37 for a potential way
of doing so.
2On the theory of a rm: The case of by-production of emissions. April 30, 2010
a radial disposability property (called weak disposability) that is weaker than standard
output free-disposability.10
Murty and Russell [2010] show that a single production relation between inputs of
intended production, intended outputs, and the emission is not rich enough to capture
all the trade-os between goods that are exhibited by an emission generating technol-
ogy.11 Early works of Frisch [1965], which have recently been applied by Frsund [2009]
in the context of pollution generating technologies, show the need for multiple production
relations for modeling technologies where some inputs and outputs exhibit technological
non-rivalness/jointness. Murty and Russell [2010] show that all the above attributes of
emission generation by rms can be captured in a model of a technology that is derived
as an intersection of two technologies: (i) a technology dened by laws of nature regard-
ing emission generation and (ii) a technology dened by the relation between inputs and
outputs in intended production. Standard free disposability assumptions can be assumed
for (ii), but (i) will necessarily violate free-disposability of both emission generation and
the inputs that cause emissions in nature. As a result, the observed technology derived as
an intersection of (i) and (ii) violates free disposability of both emissions and inputs that
cause the emissions.
In Section 2, we provide a motivating example that shows the inadequacy of a sin-
gle production relation in capturing all the above ve features of emission generation by
rms. In Section 3, we provide a denition of \by-production (BP)." Technologies that
satisfy (BP) have all the ve attributes of emission generation mentioned above. We show
that such technologies violate standard disposability assumptions and that the Murty and
Russell [2010] characterization is both a necessary and sucient characterization of tech-
nologies that satisfy (BP). In particular, such a characterization implies that the emissions
generated by a rm do not impose external eects on its own production of intended out-
puts.12 On the other hand, when such external eects are present, then we show that
technologies of emission generating rms may violate the fourth and fth attributes of
emission generating technologies mentioned above. Such technologies satisfy a weaker
condition (WBP) than (BP). In Section 4, we give four examples to illustrate all the
results in Section 3.
In Section 5, we provide an application of our by-production approach to the identi-
cation of various options open to rms for abating emissions and their associated costs.
In the context of a simple model that exhibits by-production, we dene the marginal tech-
nical abatement costs and the marginal economic abatement cost. Various factors that
aect these marginal costs of abatement are unravelled and their properties are explained
in terms of standard assumptions made in economics regarding intended production by
rms. In the context of a simple model that satises (BP), we nd that while common
abatement paths considered in the literature do involve a technological trade-o between
10 For the output approach with weak disposability, see Shephard [1953], F are, Grosskopf, Noh, and
Yaisawarng [1993], F are, Grosskopf, and Pasurka [1986], F are, Grosskopf, Lovell, and Pasurka [1989],
F are, Grosskopf, Noh, and Weber [2005], and Murty and Kumar [2002, 2003] among others.
11 This is true both in the presence or absence of cleaning-up options available to rms.
12 It may impose external eects on the rest of the society though.
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emission reduction and intended production, there also almost always exist abatement
paths where it is possible to have both greater emission reductions and greater intended
outputs. We also nd that marginal abatement costs are usually decreasing in the initial
level of emissions of rms. Counterintuitive as these results may sound in the rst instance,
they are intuitively obvious when we adopt the by-production approach to modeling emis-
sion generating technologies as it is rich enough to incorporate both standard economic
assumptions with respect to intended technologies of rms and the rules of nature that
govern emission generation. We conclude in Section 6. Most proofs are simple and are
relegated to the appendix.
2. Notation and a motivating example.
2.1. Notation.
The commodity-space in which technologies are empirically observed is the space
Rn+m+2
+ formed by the coordinates Rm+1
+ reserved for m intended outputs and a cleaning-
up activity of the rm hy;ci 2 Rm+1
+ , Rn
+ reserved for n inputs x 2 Rn
+, and R+
reserved for the by-product z 2 R+.13 We index inputs by i and intended outputs
by j. We assume that, in nature, inputs 1;:::;n1 cause emissions, while the remain-
ing n2 = n   n1 inputs do not. Similarly, intended outputs 1;:::;m1 cause emissions,
while the remaining m2 = m   m1 intended outputs do not. Likewise, we partition
the input and intended output vectors into x = hx1;x2i 2 R
n1+n2
+ and y = hy1;y2i 2
R
m1+m2
+ , respectively. Let T  Rn+m+2
+ denote a technology of the rm in the em-
pirically observed space of commodities. Dene also various restrictions of T such as
PT(x;y;c) := fz  0j hx;y;c;zi 2 Tg, PT(x;y j;c;z) := fyj  0j hx;y j;yj;c;zi 2 Tg,
and PT(x;y j;c) = fhz;yji 2 R2
+j hx;y j;yj;c;zi 2 Tg for all j = 1;:::;m.
2.2. A motivating example.
Consider the case where a rm employs wood, water, chemicals, labor, and capital
as inputs to produce paper (y 2 R+). Wood and chemicals (x1 2 R+ and x2 2 R+)
leave behind residuals which are the emissions (z 2 R+) of paper production. Thus,
x1 = hx1;x2i and x2 = hx3;x4;x5i. The larger the amount of chemicals and wood used
by the rm, the greater is the maximal amount of paper it can produce and the greater is
also the minimal level of emissions that it can generate. Consider any single production
relation that satises standard assumptions with respect to the intended output and all
13 For the sake of notational ease, we restrict our analysis to a single emission generated by any rm.
We believe that the analysis can be generalized to the case of multiple emissions. It can be shown, along
the lines of the analysis to follow, that in the case a rm generates more than one emission, more than
two production relations may be required to characterize its technology.
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inputs and aims to capture the positive correlation between emission generation and paper
production. One such example is







The implied technology of the rm is14








The technically ecient production vectors are those that satisfy (2.1). Such a relation
is inadequate to capture all the attributes of emission generation mentioned in Section 1
because of the following reasons.
(i) It implies that along the ecient frontier, the trade-os between the residual and the












< 0 8 i = 1;2: (2.3)
(ii) (2.1) implies that for a xed vector of all inputs hx1;:::;x5i, there is a whole menu of
ecient paper and residual combinations ( see Figure 1(a)).15 This also contradicts
the fact that the minimal amount of the residual generated changes if and only if
the levels of the chemical or wood inputs change. Similarly, the maximal amount of
paper produced can change if and only if inputs of paper production change.16 This
implies that if all inputs are held xed, then there exist only one ecient combination
of residual and paper that the rm can produce.
(iii) Figure 1(a) also shows that, at xed level of all inputs, the ecient level of paper
produced increases when the level of residual increase and that the menu of ecient
paper-residual combinations in unbounded. This can be true only if the residual
imposes a positive externality on paper production, i.e., the residual is a productive
input into paper production{which would seem counter-intuitive.
The literature17 would justify production relations of the type (2.1) by assuming the
existence of implicit cleaning-up options available to the paper producing rm, e.g., an
auent treatment plant that cleans up the residual generated: holding the vector of all
inputs (including chemicals and wood) xed, the rm can be diverting more of the inputs
14 Note, that this technology is consistent with both the input and output approaches to modeling
emissions that are seen in the standard literature: it treats emission like an input and also satises the
weak-disposability assumption of Shephard [1953].
15 PT(x1;x2;x3;x4;x5) in the gure is the restriction of T to the space of y and z for the given input
vector.
16 This is true assuming that the residuals do not generate external eects on paper production.
17 See references in Footnotes 9 and 10 in Section 1.
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into cleaning-up activities, so that less of both residuals and paper are produced. If such a
perspective is adopted to interpret (2.1), then (2.2) is only a reduced-form description of the
technology, as it does not explicitly model cleaning-up eorts. The full technology lies in
the space of all goods{intended outputs, inputs, cleaning-up activities, and the emissions.
Thus, the full technology would involve another production relation, in addition to (2.1),
that explicitly involves cleaning-up options available to the rm. More importantly, if
we require the technology to satisfy attributes one to ve of emission generation in the
introductory section then nature's residual generating mechanism implies that there is a
minimum (and perhaps a maximum) amount of residual associated with every level of
wood and chemical used by the rm, and that this minimum amount will increase as more
and more of these inputs are used. A restriction of such a technology in the space of
chemicals and the residual is shown in Figure 1(c). Clearly, the technology must violate
both output free-disposability of emission and input free-disposability of chemicals. But
T in (2.2) satises standard disposability assumptions with respect to paper and all its
inputs (see Figure 1(b)). Thus, (2.2) may not be an appropriate specication of even the
reduced-form technology underlying this example.
3. By-production and a necessary and sucient characterization of technolo-
gies satisfying by-production.
3.1. A denition of by-production (BP) and properties of technologies satisfying (BP).
In this section we dene the concept of by-production and show that technologies
that satisfy by-production have all the observed properties mentioned in the introductory
section.
First, we dene three important projections of any observed emission generating tech-
nology T: (i) its projection into the space of all goods other than the emission{ 
T :=
fhx;y;ci 2 Rm+n+1j hx;y;c;zi 2 T for some z  0g, (ii) for all j = 1;:::;m, its projec-
tion into the space of all goods other than the jth intended output{ 
j
T := fhx;y j;c;zi 2
Rm+n+1j hx;y j;yj;c;zi 2 T for some yj  0g, and (iii) for all j = 1;:::;m, its pro-
jection into the space of all goods other than the jth intended output and the emission{

j
T := fhx;y j;ci 2 Rn+m
+ j hx;y j;yj;c;zi 2 T for some hz;yji 2 R2
+g. These pro-
jections form the domains of the following mappings associated with T:18 the functions
18 Explicit specication of these projections is important as our examples in the next section demonstrate
that these sets may be quite restricted and have structures that are dierent from the ones that are usually
assumed in the case of non-emission generating technologies, namely, the entire non-negative orthants of
associated Euclidean spaces.
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g : 
T ! R+,  g : 
T ! R+ [ f1g, and fj : 
j
T ! R+ [ f1g for all j = 1;:::;m with
images19
g(x;y;c) := inf fz  0j z 2 PT(x;y;c)g; (3.1)
fj(x;z;c;y j) := sup fyj  0j yj 2 PT(x;y j;c;z)g; if PT(x;y j;c;z) is bounded and
:= 1; otherwise;
(3.2)
 g(x;y;c) := sup fz  0j z 2 PT(x;y;c)g; if PT(x;y;c) is bounded and
:= 1; otherwise;
(3.3)
and the restriction mapping PT : 
j
T 7! R2
+ with image PT(x;y j;c).
The functions g() and  g() specify the minimum and maximum bounds on the level of
emission a rm with technology T can generate given xed levels of all (including emission
generating) inputs, intended outputs, and its cleaning-up eort.20 The function fj()
species the maximum amount of the jth intended output that it can produce given xed
levels of all other intended outputs, inputs, emission, and cleaning-up eort. Given the
domains of these functions, the constraint sets of the optimization problems dening these
functions are non-empty. The following provides a denition of an emission generating
technology.
Denition: T satises by-production (BP) if
(i) T is closed,
(ii) for all j = 1;:::;m and for all hx;y j;c;zi 2 
j
T, the set PT(x;y j;c;z) is bounded,
(iii) for all hx;y;ci 2 
T, we have g(x;y;c) > 0 only if hx1;y1i 6= 0 and there exists
hx;y;ci 2 
T such that g(x;y;c) > 0,
(iv) for all hx;y;ci and h x;  y; ci 2 
T, we have
(a) g(x;y;c)  g( x;  y; c) if x1   x1, y1   y1, and c   c. There exist hx;y;ci and
h x;  y; ci 2 
T such that hx1;y1;ci 6= h x1;  y1; ci, x1   x1, y1   y1, c   c, and
g(x;y;c) > g( x;  y; c),
(b) g(x;y;c) > g( x;  y; c) only if hx1;y1;ci 6= h x1;  y1; ci and it is not the case that
x1   x1, y1   y1, and c   c,
(c)  g(x;y;c) 6=  g( x;  y; c) only if hx1;y1;ci 6= h x1;  y1; ci,
(v) for all j = m1 + 1;:::;m and for all hx;y j;c;zi and h x;  y j; c;  zi 2 
j
T, we have
(a) fj(x;y j;c;z)  fj( x;  y j; c;  z) if x   x, y j   y j, and c   c, and
19 A function fc(), similar to fj(), can also be dened for cleaning-up eort of the rm and the denition
of by-production below can be extended to include properties with respect to cleaning-up eort as well.
Here, in the interest of economizing on notation, we ignore this aspect. Nothing qualitatively substantive
is lost by this omission in this analysis.
20 Burning a given amount of coal always results in a certain minimum amount of smoke. Technical
ineciency may generate more smoke than the minimum possible, but it is reasonable to assume that
there is also a bound on the maximum smoke that can be emitted with the xed amount of coal.
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(b) fj(x;y j;c;z) > fj( x;  y j; c;  z) only if hx;y j;ci 6= h x;  y j; ci and it is not the
case that x   x, y j   y j, and c   c.
(i) and (ii) in the denition of (BP) ensure that, for any j, fj() is well-dened. Hence,
there exists a maximum amount of intended output j for every vector of inputs, cleaning-
up eort, intended outputs other than j, and emission. (iii) implies that the emission is
generated by the rm only because it employs inputs x1 and outputs y1. The other inputs
and intended outputs are not emission generating. (i) and (iii) also imply that g() is well
dened and that T is non-trivially an emission generating technology, i.e., there is a level
of its operation where it emits positive amount of the emission. (iv) captures the expected
monotonicity properties of function g(). Part (a) of (iv) implies that the minimum level
of emission increases if the rm employs more and more of the emission producing inputs
or produces more and more of the emission producing outputs or decreases its cleaning-up
eort. Parts (b) and (c) of (iv) imply that the minimum and maximum level of emission
depend only on x1, y1, and c and are unaected by changes in inputs x2 and intended
outputs y2. Part (a) of (v) captures the expected monotonicity properties of function fj(),
where j is a non-emission generating intended output: The maximum amount of intended
output j is non-decreasing in all inputs, non-increasing in the remaining intended outputs
and cleaning-up eorts. Part (b) of (v) says that if all inputs, cleaning-up eort, and other
intended outputs are held xed, then the maximum amount of output j is unaected by
the level of emissions.21
For all j = 1;:::;m, dene the correspondences Pj : 
j
T 7! R2





Pj(x;y j;c) = fhz;yji 2 PT(x;y j;c)j yj = fj(x;y j;c;z) ^ z = g(x;y j;yj;c)g
 Pj(x;y j;c) = fhz;yji 2 PT(x;y j;c)j yj = fj(x;y j;c;z) ^ z =  g(x;y j;yj;c)g:
(3.4)
The correspondence Pj() identies the menu of ecient combinations of the emission
and the jth intended output for given levels of all inputs, remaining intended outputs,
and cleaning-up eort.22 Theorem 1 demonstrates that for technologies that satisfy (BP)
this correspondence is single-valued{there is only one minimum level of the emission and
one maximum level of the non-emission causing intended output j, when all resources
and all other outputs are held xed. (Contrast this with the example in Section 2.)
This theorem also demonstrates a positive correlation between the emission and any non-
emission generating intended output when some inputs are the cause of the emission and
a negative correlation between the emission and any non-emission generating intended
output when some intended outputs are the cause of the emission.
21 Thus, a rm's emission does not impose external eects on its own intended production activities.
This is a common implicit assumption in most empirical works in the literature (see, e.g., references in
Footnote 10) that involve a rm-level analysis. We will consider a weaker assumption later, which allows
such externalities.
22 Similarly, we can interpret the correspondence  Pj().
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Theorem 1: Suppose m1 < m and T  Rn+m+2
+ satises (BP). Then, for all j =
m1 + 1;:::;m,
(1.) the correspondences Pj() and  Pj() are single-valued (functions) and
(2.) if hz;yji 2 Pj(x1;x2;y1;y2 j;c) and h z;  yji 2 Pj( x1;x2;  y1;y2 j; c) then
(a) z   z and yj   yj whenever  x1  x1,  c  c, and y1 =  y1 and
(b) z   z and yj   yj whenever  x1 = x1,  c = c, and y1   y1.
Input and output free disposability are dened in a standard way:
Denition: T satises input free disposability (IFD) if hx;y;c;zi 2 T and  x  x implies
h x;y;c;zi 2 T.
Denition: T satises output free disposability (OFD) if hx;y;c;zi 2 T and h y; ci  hy;ci
implies hx;  y; c;zi 2 T.
Theorem 2 shows that if T satises (BP) then it violates (IFD) and (OFD). T violates
free disposability of the emission causing inputs and cleaning-up eort of the rm. This is
because g() provides the lower bound on the emission and this function is non-decreasing
in the emission causing inputs and non-increasing in the cleaning-up eort of the rm.23 If
the upper bound on emissions  g is also increasing in the emission causing intended outputs,
then free-disposability of these outputs is also violated.
Theorem 2: Suppose T  Rn+m+2
+ satises (BP) and
(1) m1 = 0 or
(2) there exist hx;y;ci 2 
T and hx;  y1;y2;ci 2 
Y such that  y1  y1,  y1 6= y1, and
 g(x;y;c) >  g(x;  y1;y2;c).
Then T does not satisfy (OFD) and (IFD).
While (BP) is inconsistent with free disposability of goods that aect emission gener-
ation, we could still assume standard free disposability in the non-emission causing goods.
In particular, we dene
Denition: T satises restricted output free disposability (ROFD) if hx;y;c;zi 2 T and
 y2  y2 implies hx;y1;  y2;c;zi 2 T.24
We also dene costly disposability of emissions as the case where all convex combi-
nations of the upper and the lower bounds on emissions are also technologically feasible.
Denition: T satises costly disposability of by-product (CDB) if hx;y;ci 2 
T implies
g(x;y;c) <  g(x;y;c) and hx;y;c;g(x;y;c) + (1   ) g(x;y;c)i 2 T for all  2 [0;1].
23 Recall Figure 1(c).
24 Similarly we can dene restricted input free disposability (RIFD).
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Dene the graphs of the functions g() and fj() for all j = 1;:::;m:
GT :=







hx;y;c;zi 2 Tj yj = fj(x;y j;c;z)
	: (3.5)
Theorem 3 shows that if T satises (BP) and (ROFD) or (CDB) then the graphs of the
functions g() and fj() for any non-emission generating intended output j are not identical,
i.e., these functions are not inverses of another and provide distinct information regarding








is the inverse of the production function fy in (2.1). On the
other hand Theorem 3 also shows that the functions fj are inverses of one another for
all the non-emission causing intended outputs j.25 Thus, all such functions fj provide
the same information about T.26 Theorem 5 in the next section will provide a functional
representation of T employing the two distinct relations underlying g() and fj() for any
j = m1 + 1;:::;m.
Theorem 3: Suppose T  Rn+m+2
+ satises (BP) and m1 < m.
(1) If T also satises (CDB) then, for all j = m1 + 1;:::;m, we have GT 6= F
j
T.
(2) If T also satises (ROFD) then, for all j = m1 + 1;:::;m, we have GT 6= F
j
T.




T or if there exist
hx;y;c;zi 2 T such that yj = fj(x;y j;j0
;yj0;c;z) but yj0 6= fj(x;y j;j0
;yj;c;z) =: ~ yj0
then yj = fj(x;y j;j0
; ~ yj0;c;z).
3.2. A necessary and sucient characterization of technologies satisfying by-production.
By-products such as emissions are outputs of rms, whose production is governed by
certain laws of nature. From the point of view of these natural laws, the inputs required to
produce the by-product z are x1, y1, and c. In fact, the cleaning-up eorts c of rms are
unproductive (bad) inputs of by-product generation. On the other hand, from the point of
view of intended production, y1, y2, and c are outputs and x1 and x2 are inputs. Further,
if we allow for external eects that a rm's emission z can impose on the production of its
own intended outputs, then z is also an input into intended production.27 Moreover, while
inputs x exhibit rivalness in the production of y and c,28 they jointly produce intended
25 Precisely, this result holds if we exclude the weakly ecient portions of T from our consideration.
26 With respect to the non-emission generating outputs, T shows properties similar to standard multiple-
output non-emission generating technologies.
27 If it imposes a negative external eect, then it is an unproductive or a bad input used in the production
of y and c.
28 i.e., a given level x of inputs is shared between the productions of various intended outputs and
cleaning-up eort
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outputs and the by-product.29 Similarly, the use of intended outputs y1 as inputs in the
production of z does not reduce the marketable amounts of these intended outputs.
The properties of technology T dened in the empirically observed space Rn+m+2
+ of
goods are a result of all the above dierent roles that goods y, x, c, and z play in both
intended production and by-product generation. In this section we will disentangle and
delineate all these dierent roles by describing technological relations in a larger space of
commodities.30 By doing so, we will obtain another characterization of a technology T
that satises (BP) in the empirically observed space Rn+m+2
+ .
z+ 2 R+ will denote the amount of by-product (incidental output) that is produced
by a rm and z  2 R+ will denote the role of the by-product produced by the rm in
generating external eects on the production of the intended outputs. y+ 2 Rm
+ will
denote the vector of intended outputs produced by the rm, while y  2 Rm
+ will denote
the vector of intended outputs that go in as inputs in the process of generation of the
by-product z+ in nature. x 2 Rn will denote the role of the associated goods as inputs in
both intended production and by-production. c+ 2 R+ is the cleaning-up eort produced
in intended production and c  2 R+ is the input of cleaning-up eort used to mitigate




The rst type, called an intended production technology (IPT), will be denoted by
T1  R
n+2(m+2)
+ . It is concerned only with the roles as outputs of the goods denoted
by y and c, the roles as inputs of the goods denoted by x, and the role of z as an in-
put.31 Thus, it contains vectors of the form hx;y+;y ;c+;c ;z+;z i 2 R
n+2(m+2)
+ with
z+ = 0, c  = 0, and y  = 0. We dene the following sets induced by this technology:

T1 := fhx;y+;c+i 2 Rn+m+1











+ ;c+i 2 Rn+mj hx;y
 j
+ ;yj+;0;c+;0;0;z i 2 T1 for some hyj;zi 2 R2
+g
for j = 1;:::;m. In an obvious way, we can also dene various restrictions of T1 such as
PT1(x;y+;c+), PT1(x;y j
+;c+;z ), and PT1(x;y j
+;c+) for j = 1;:::;m.32
The second type, called a by-product generating technology (BPT), will be denoted
by T2  R
n+2(m+2)
+ . It is concerned only with the roles of the goods denoted by y and c
as inputs, the roles of the goods denoted by x as inputs, and the role of z as an output of
production.33 Thus, it contains vectors of the form hx;y+;y ;c+;c ;z+;z i 2 R
n+2(m+2)
+




29 i.e., if generation of the by-product requires a certain level of x1, then it does not reduce the amount
of x1 left to be shared between the production of y and c.
30 Not dissimilar to commodity spaces found in Milleron [1972] in the context of public goods.
31 Note, these are the roles that these goods assume in intended production activities of rms.
32 For example, PT1(x;y+;c+) = fz  2 R+j hx;y+;0;c+;0;0;z i 2 T1g.
33 Note, these are the roles that these goods assume in nature's by-product generation mechanism.
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and 
j




As in the case of technologies dened in the empirically observed space Rn+m+2
+ , we
dene functions that specify the bounds on intended outputs and levels of the externality
that are consistent with T1 holding all other goods xed: GT1 : 
T1 ! R+,  GT1 : 
T1 !




T1 ! R+ [ f1g for all j = 1;:::;m with images




+;c+;z ) := sup fyj+  0j yj+ 2 PT1(x;y j
+;c+;z )g;
if PT1(x;y j




 GT1(x;y+;c+) := sup fz   0j z  2 PT (x;y+;c+)g;
if PT (x;y+;c+) is bounded and
:= 1; otherwise:
(3.8)
Similarly too, we can dene functions: GT2 : 
T2 ! R+,  GT2 : 









 ;c ;z+), and  GT2(x;y ;c ).
The properties of an IPT are summarized in the denition below. They include
standard assumptions of boundedness of intended outputs and free disposability of inputs
and outputs that are normally imposed on non-emission generating technologies (qualied
only by external eects of z on intended production).
Denition: T1  R
n+2(m+2)
+ is an intended production technology (IPT) if
(i) T1 is closed and hx;y+;y ;c+;c ;z+;z i 2 T1 implies that z+ = 0, c  = 0, and
y  = 0,
(ii) for all j = 1;:::;m, PT1(x;y
 j
+ ;c+;z ) is bounded for all hx;y
 j
+ ;c+;z i 2 
j
T1, and
(iii) for all j = 1;:::;m and for all hx;y
 j
+ ;c+;z i; h x;  y
 j





+ ;c+;z )  PT1( x;  y
 j




+ ; and  c+  c+.35
From the denition of an IPT, the following obvious remark regarding the monotonic-
ity properties of function Fj with respect to inputs and outputs of intended production
34 For example, 
T2 := fhx;y ;c i 2 R
n+m+1
+ j hx;0;y ;0;c ;0z+;0i 2 T2 for some z+ 2 R+g and
PT1(x;y j
 ;c ;z+) = fyj  2 R+j hx;0;y
 j
  ;yj ;0;c ;z+;0i 2 T2g.
35 This is equivalent to T1 satisfying free disposability of all inputs, intended outputs, and abatement
output.
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Remark 1: Let T1  R
n+2(m+2)
+ be an IPT. For all j = 1;:::;m and for all hx;y j
+;c+;z i;
h x;  y
 j






T1( x;  y
 j
+ ; c+;z ) if  x  x,  y
 j
+  y j






T1( x;  y
 j
+ ; c+;z ) only if h x;  y
 j
+ ; c+i 6= hx;y j
+;c+i and it




+ , and  c+  c+.
The properties of a BPT are summarized in the denition below. They specify the
laws of nature regarding by-product generation. They are similar to (CDB) and properties
(iii) and (iv) that were assumed in the denition of (BP) in the empirically observed
commodity space.37
Denition: T2  R
n+2(m+2)
+ is nature's by-product producing technology (BPT) if
(i) T2 is closed and hx;y+;y ;c+;c ;z+;z i 2 T2 implies that z  = 0, c+ = 0, and
y+ = 0,
(ii) GT2(x;y ;c ) > 0 implies hx1;y1
 ;c i 6= 0 and there exists hx;y ;c i 2 
T2 such
that GT2(x;y ;c ) > 0,
(iii) z+ = GT2(x;y ;c )+(1  ) GT2(x;y ;c ) 2 PT2(x;y ;c ) for all  2 [0;1] and for
every hx;y ;c i 2 
T2, and
(iv) for all hx1;x2;y1
 ;y2
 ;c i 2 
T2 and h x1;  x2;  y1
 ;  y2




 ;c )  GT2( x1;  x2;  y1
 ;  y2
 ; c ) if  y1
   y1
 ;  x1  x1, and  c   c 
and there exist hx1;x2;y1
 ;y2
 ;c i 2 
T2 and h x1;  x2;  y1
 ;  y2
 ; c i 2 
T2 such that
h x1;  y1
 ; c i 6= hx1;y1
 ;c i,  y1
   y1
 ;  x1  x1,  c   c , and GT2(x1;x2;y1
 ;y2
 ;c ) >





 ;c ) > GT2( x1;  x2;  y1
 ;  y2
 ; c ) only if h x1;  y1
 ; c i 6= hx1;y1
 ;c i
and it is not the case that  y1
   y1
 ;  x1  x1, and  c   c , and
36 The monotonicity properties with respect to z  depends on the nature of externalities that it generates
in intended production.
37 Environmental resources such as air and water are inputs of nature's emission generating mechanism,
so they should form a part of the BPT. Moreover, such resources are non-subsitutable inputs in emission
generation. An example of a production relation that incorporates a natural resource, denoted by r 2 R+,
as a non-substitutable input of the BPT is
z+  minfGT2(x;y ;c );rg; (3.9)
where  > 0 is the assimilative capacity of the natural resource to absorb one unit of the emission. Though
in our model, we abstract from including r, the demand for this input is immediately determined from
(3.9) once the level of emission is known.
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(c)  GT2(x1;x2;y1
 ;y2
 ;c ) 6=  GT2( x1;  x2;  y1
 ;  y2
 ; c ) only if h x1;  y1
 ; c i 6= hx1;y1
 ;c i.38
Given any IPT T1  R
n+2(m+2)
+ and BPT T2  R
n+2(m+2)
+ we can derive a technology









It is easy to derive the relevant projections for the technology T(T1;T2). These inherit
their structures from both the IPT and BPT underlying T(T1;T2).

T(T1;T2) = fhx;y;ci 2 
T1 \ 
T2j PT1(x;y;c) \ PT2(x;y;c) 6= ;g; (3.11)

j












T2j PT1(x;y j;c) \ PT2(x;y j;c) 6= ;g (3.13)
for all j = 1;:::;m. In that case, for all hx;y;ci 2 
T(T1;T2), for all j = 1;:::;m, and for
all hx;y j;c;zi 2 
j
T(T1;T2), we have
g(x;y;c) =minfz 2 R+j z 2 PT(T1;T2)(x;y;c)g
=minfz 2 R+j z 2 PT1(x;y;c) \ PT2(x;y;c)g;
 g(x;y;c) =maxfz 2 R+j z 2 PT(T1;T2)(x;y;c)g
=maxfz 2 R+j z 2 PT1(x;y;c) \ PT2(x;y;c)g; and
fj(x;y j;c;z) =maxfyj 2 R+j yj 2 PT(T1;T2)(x;y j;c;z)g
=maxfyj 2 R+j yj 2 PT1(x;y j;c;z) \ PT2(x;y j;c;z)g:
(3.14)
(3.14) suggests that the functions g(),  g, and fj() inherit their properties from both the
IPT T1 and the BPT T2.40
Theorem 4 provides a sucient characterization of a technology satisfying (BP) in
the observed space Rn+m+2
+ .41 If the production relation underlying an IPT (T1) is inde-
pendent of external eects generated by the by-product z then, given that the production
relation underlying a BPT (T2) is independent of goods x2 and y2, we nd that the tech-
nology T(T1;T2) in the observed commodity space Rn+m+2
+ satises (BP).
38 Recall, the minimum and maximum amount of by-product is not aected by y2 and x2 given our
primitive assumptions.
39 Having distinguished between an IPT and BPT in terms of the roles played by dierent goods in
intended production and the production of by-products, we conveniently, and without confusion, ignore
all the subscripts + and   that were employed earlier in this section.
40 The next section provides some examples to illustrate this.
41 It is a formalization of the results in Murty and Russell [2010].
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Theorem 4: Let T1  R
n+2(m+2)
+ be an IPT and T2  R
n+2(m+2)
+ be a BPT and dene
T := T(T1;T2). Suppose the following hold:
(a) for all j = 1;:::;m and for all hx;y;ci 2 
T1, we have
PT1(x;y;c) = R+ (3.15)
and
(b) for all hx1;y1;c;zi 2 Rn1+m1+2 such that PT2(x1;y1




Then T satises (BP), (CDB), (RIFD), and (ROFD).
If T  Rn+m+2
+ satises (BP) then it follows that, for any j = m1 + 1;:::;m, the
function fj() will be invariant to changes in z and the functions g() and  g() will be invariant
to changes in yj. In that case, it follows from Theorem 1 that, for all j = m1 + 1;:::;m,
there exist functions j : 
j
T ! R+, j : 
j
T ! R+, and  j : 
j
T ! R+ such that
Pj(x;y j;c) = hj(x;y j;c); j(x;y j;c)i and
 Pj(x;y j;c) = hj(x;y j;c);  j(x;y j;c)i:
(3.17)
In Theorem 5, conclusions of Theorem 1 are employed, rstly, to obtain a functional
representation of a technology T that satises (BP) in the empirically observed space
Rn+m+2
+ and, secondly, to construct an IPT (T1), which is independent of z, and a BPT
(T2), which is independent of y2 and x2, such that T = T(T1;T2). This will demonstrate
that the sucient characterization in Theorem 4 of a technology satisfying (BP) in the
observed space of commodities is also necessary.
Theorem 5: If T  Rn+m+2
+ satises (BP), (ROFD), and (CDB) then,




+ j hx;y j;ci 2 
j
T ^ yj  j(x;y j;c)




(2) there exist an IPT T1  R
n+2(m+2)
+ satisfying Assumption (a) of Theorem 4 and a
BPT T2  R
n+2(m+2)
+ satisfying Assumption (b) of Theorem 4 such that T = T(T1;T2).
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We now provide a weaker denition of technologies that generate emissions than
(BP). All that is required by this denition is that there exist some intended outputs or
inputs of a rm that can generate an emission, a positive amount of emission is actually
observed at some combination of intended outputs and inputs, and that there are maximal
and minimal bounds on emission generation and the production of intended outputs. No
restrictions of monotonicity are placed on the various bounds on T 2 Rn+m+2
+ .
Denition: T 2 Rn+m+2
+ satises weak by-production (WBP) if
(i) T is closed,
(ii) for all j = 1;:::;m and for all hx;y j;c;zi 2 
j
T, the set P(x;y j;c;z) is bounded,
and
(iii) there exists hx;y;ci 2 
T such that g(x;y;c) > 0.
Theorem 6 shows that, in general, combining any IPT in the extended commodity
space with any BPT ensures only that the resulting technology in the empirically observed
space satises (WBP). Bounds of the observed technology may violate the monotonicity
properties in the denition of (BP) if the underlying IPT is not independent of external
eects of the emission.42 Employing the bounds of the underlying IPT and the BPT, it
also provides a functional representation of the derived observed technology in Rn+m+2
+ .
Theorem 6: Let T1  R
n+2(m+2)
+ be an IPT and T2  R
n+2(m+2)
+ be a BPT. Suppose
the following hold:
(a) there exists hx;y;ci 2 
T(T1\T2) such that GT2(x;y;c) > 0 and




Then T(T1;T2) satises (WBP), (RIFD), and (ROFD) and, given any j = m1+1;:::;m,




+ j hx;y j;c;zi 2 
j
T1 ^ hx;y;ci 2 
T2
^ yj  F
j
T1(x;y j;c;z)




42 Examples 3 and 4 in the next section demonstrate this.
43 hx;y j;c;zi 2 
j
T1 and yj  F
j
T1(x;y j;c;z) imply that hx;y;0;c;0;0;zi 2 T1. Hence, hx;y;ci 2 
T1
and GT1(x;y;c) and  GT1(x;y;c) are well-dened. hx;y;ci 2 
T2 and minf GT1(x;y;c);  GT2(x;y;c)g  z 
maxfGT1(x;y;c);GT2(x;y;c)g imply that hx;0;y;0;c;z;0i 2 T2.
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Corollary to Theorem 6: If all conditions of Theorem 4 hold then, given any j =
m1 + 1;:::;m, T can be functionally represented by
T = fhx;y;c;zi 2 Rn+m+2
+ j hx;y j;c;zi 2 
j




T1(x;y j;c;z) ^ GT2(x;y;c)  z   GT2(x;y;c)g:
(3.21)
4. Examples of by-production.
In this section, we study four examples to illustrate the by-production approach to mod-
eling emission generating technologies. Each example species a particular pair of IPT
and BPT, from which a technology in the space of the observed variables is derived and its
properties are studied. The rst two examples lead to observed technologies that satises
(BP), while the last two examples lead to observed technologies that satisfy (WBP). In
the rst example, some inputs are the cause of the emission, while in the second case, an
intended output is the cause of the emission. The third and fourth examples consider pairs
of IPT and BPT, where the emissions also impose (negative and positive) external eects
on the IPT. All our results of the previous section are illustrated through these examples.
The projections and restrictions of the technologies in the observed spaces that are derived
from various pairs of IPT and BPT as well as the various bounds on them exhibit non-
standard structures. This is because they inherit features from both the IPTs and BPTs
associated with them. In particular, standard disposability properties are violated by those
goods that aect both intended production and nature's emission generation. When an
emission of a rm also impose externalities on its intended production then, contrary to
conclusions of Theorem 1, for given levels of all inputs, there may exist a considerable
menu of ecient combinations of the emission and intended outputs.
4.1. Example 1 (paper production): Inputs as sources of emission and no emission-
externality on intended production.
The example of paper production in Section 2 is considered again. Cleaning-up eort of the
rm is also explicitly modeled. Here, n = 5; n1 = 2; n3 = 3, m = 1, and m1 = 0. Suppose
the intended production technology and the nature's by-product generating technology
have the following forms:
T1 = fhx1;x2;y;0;c;0;0;zi 2 R11





i   cg and










17On the theory of a rm: The case of by-production of emissions. April 30, 2010
where vi > 0 for all i = 1;:::;5,
P5
i=1 vi  1, i > 0 for all i = 1;2,  > 0, and 
 > 0.
It is easy to check that T1 and T2 in (4.1) satisfy the denitions of an IPT and a BPT,
respectively. Let us consider various projections and restrictions of the IPT and BPT:







i   cg and










i   c  0g and









The structure of PT1(x;z;c) in (4.2) demonstrate that, from the point of view of intended
production, paper production is unaected by the presence of chemical residuals. In ad-
dition, the structure of PT1(x;y;c) demonstrates that Assumption (a) of Theorem 4 holds
for this example. Thus, in this example, T1 is independent of generation of emissions.
Some of the projections and restrictions induced by T2 are





ixi   c   
g and




ixi   c  z 
2 X
i=1









ixi   c  z 
2 X
i=1
ixi   cg and




The structure of PT2(x;z;c) in (4.3) demonstrates that nature's by-product generating
technology is, ceteris paribus, unaected by the output of paper. The structure of PT2(x;z;c)
in (4.3) shows that Assumption (b) of Theorem 4 also holds for this example. Thus, in
this example, the BPT is independent of the level of the intended output.
Denote the observed technology obtained from the pair of IPT and BPT in (4.1) by
T := T(T1;T2)  R8
+. For this observed technology, note that for all hx;y;ci 2 
T1 \
T2,




T2 and PT(x;y;c) = PT2(x;y;c); (4.4)
i.e., the observed technology T inherits its projection 
T and restriction PT(x;y;c) from
the BPT of (4.1). On the other hand, it can be shown that (4.2) and (4.3) also imply that
it inherits its projection 
y





T1 and PT(x;c;z) = PT1(x;c;z): (4.5)
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The function g : 
T ! R+ is obtained as




ixi   c if
X
i
ixi   c  0 and




ixi   c  0
(4.6)
Similarly, we obtain  g : 
T ! R+ with image




ixi   c: (4.7)
The function fy : 
y
T ! R+ is obtained as








We now check the properties of T. Clearly the T is closed. For all hx;c;zi 2 
y
T,
(4.2) implies that the set PT(x;c;z) = PT1(x;c;z) is bounded. For appropriately chosen
values of the parameters, it is not dicult to nd a production vector hx;y;c;zi 2 T such
that g(x;y;c) > 0.44 Thus, T satises conditions (i) to (iii) in the denition of (BP).
The function g() is non-increasing in the extent of cleaning-up eorts of the rm and
non-decreasing in the levels of chemicals and wood used in intended production. Ceteris
paribus, it is unaected by the output of paper y. This is because, according to the nature
dened BPT in this example, the residual generated is aected only by the use of chemical
and wood inputs and the cleaning-up eorts of the rm. Hence, so long as all inputs and
cleaning-up eorts are held xed, an increase in paper production (which is still possible,
if there is technical ineciency in paper production at this xed level of inputs) has no
eect on residual generation.
The function fy() is increasing in the amounts of all inputs used by the rm and
decreasing in the amount of cleaning up eorts of the rm. Ceteris paribus, it is unaected
by the level of residual generated{if all inputs and cleaning-up eorts are held xed then
any change in residual generation (which is still possible if there are technical ineciencies
in residual generation) has no eect on paper production. The properties of the functions
g(),  g(), and fy() indicate that T also satises conditions (iv) and (v) in the denition of
(BP). Therefore, T satises (BP).
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(4.4) and (4.5) imply that T satises (CDB) and (ROFD). It also satises free dispos-
ability in any non-residual generating input.45 But it violates free-disposability of c and
any emission-generating input. This is shown in Figures 2(a) and 2(b) where we draw
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It is clear from these gures that T satises input freely disposability in non-emission
generating x3, but violates input and output free disposability in x1 and c, respectively.
This is because x3 aects only the IPT, while x1 and c aect both IPT and BPT. While
IPT has standard free disposability properties in all inputs, y, and c and is independent
of z, BPT violates standard free disposability of x1, x2, c, and z. Thus, all conclusions of
Theorem 4 hold for this example.
T satises all assumptions of parts (1) and (2) of Theorem 3. (4.6) and (4.8) shows
that g() and fy() (which T inherits from the BPT and IPT, respecitively) are not inverses
of one another{their graphs are not identical. Thus conclusions of parts 1 and 2 of Theorem
3 hold for this example. Further, in this example, it can be shown that T inherits 
y
T from













i   c  0 ^
2 X
i=1
ixi   c   
g: (4.10)
Figure 2(c) shows the restriction PT(x;c)  R2
+ for hx;ci 2 
y
T.46 In the gure, z =
 g(x;c;y), z = g(x;c;y), and y = fy(x;c;z). In particular, we note that the corre-












ixi   ci if
2 X
i=1










ixi   c  0:
(4.11)
45 This is seen in Figure 2(c) that will be discussed later.
46 Note that this gure illustrates that T satises output free disposability with respect to y but there
is a lower bound for z. Hence, it violates output free disposability with respect to the by-product z. It
satises (CDB).
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Thus, it is single valued. It is clear (see also Figure 2(d)) that this correspondence is
non-increasing in c, non-decreasing in x1 and x2, and non-decreasing in x3; x4, and x5. In
the gure hy;zi = Py(x;c) and hy;zi = Py(~ x1;x2;~ c) with ~ x1 > x1 and ~ c < c. This
demonstrates that conclusions of Theorem 1 hold for this example.
Noting that functions fy(), g(), and  g() are independent of z, y, and y, respectively,
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4.2. Example 2 (a dairy): An intended output as a source of emission and no emission
externality on intended production.
Consider the case of a dairy that uses milk (x) as an input to produce cheese (y1), butter
(y2), and cream (y3) as its intended outputs. The input milk itself is not a cause of any
emission, but a strong odor (an emission) emanates from its output of cheese. Thus,
n = 1;n2 = 1, m = 3, and m1 = 1. Suppose the intended production technology and the
by-product generating technology have the following forms:
T1 = fhx;y1;y2;y3;0;0;0;0;zi 2 R9
+j y1  x
1
2   y2   y3g and
T2 = fhx;0;0;0;y1;y2;y3;z;0i 2 R9
+j 
 + y1  z  y1g:
(4.13)
As in Example 1, it can be checked that in this example all the assumptions of Theorem 4
hold and so T := T(T1;T2) satises (BP). In particular, we nd that, whenever the various
restrictions of T are non-empty, they take the following structures:
PT(x;y1;y2;y3) = fz 2 R+j 
 + y1  z  y1g;
PT(x;y2;y3;z) = fy1 2 R+j y1  x
1








PT(x;y1;yj0;z) = fyj 2 R+j yj  x
1
2   y1   yj0g 8 j;j0 = 2;3:
(4.14)
The structure of PT(x;y2;y3;z) demonstrates that T violates free disposability of cheese,
the output that causes the odor. However, for j;j0 = 2;3, the structure of PT(x;y1;yj0;z)
shows that T satises free disposability of outputs butter and cream and the input milk
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that do not cause the emission. Further, the structure of PT(x;y1;y2;y3) demonstrates
that T satises (CDB). It can be checked that, in this example,
g(x;y1;y2;y3) := y1 = GT2(x;y1;y2;y3;
 g(x;y1;y2;y3) := 
 + y1 =  GT2(x;y1;y2;y3);
f1(x;y2;y3;z) = min fx
1






2   y1   yj0 = F
j
T1(x;y1;yj0;z) 8 j;j0 = 2;3:
(4.15)
The function g (the minimum level of strong odor) inherits all its properties from GT2
of the BPT. It is increasing in cheese, the intended output causing the odor. However,
it is unaected by the levels of butter and cream produced or the amount of milk used.
For any non-odorous output j, the function fj inherits all its properties from F
j
T1. It is
increasing in the amount of the input milk used, it is decreasing in the levels of the other
two intended outputs, and it is unaected by the odor itself. Note also that g() and fj()
are not inverses of one another. However, the two functions f2() and f3() are inverses of
one another. Thus, all conclusions of Theorem 3 hold for this example non-trivially. The
function f1 corresponding to the odorous output (cheese) inherits its properties from both
F1
T1 and F1
T2. It is, ceteris paribus, non-decreasing in x, non-increasing in y2 and y3, and is
not independent of (it is non-decreasing in) z. Further, its graph is distinct from g(),  g(),
f2(), and f3(). Thus, in this example too, more than one production relation is needed to
functionally represent the observed technology T (see Theorem 5):
T = fhx;y1;y2;y3;zi 2 R5
+j y1  x
1
2   y2   y3 ^ y1 + 
  z  y1g: (4.16)
4.3. Example 3 (a thermal power plant): An input as a source of emission and a negative
emission externality on intended production.
Consider the case of a thermal power plant that employs inputs of coal (x1) and
labor (x2) to produce electricity (y) and a by-product smoke (z). Thus, in this case
n = 2; n1 = 1, m = 1, and m1 = 0). Suppose emission z decreases the average productivity
of labor in intended production. Suppose the underlying IPT and BPT are
T1 = fhx1;x2;y;0;0;zi 2 R6






2   zg and
T2 = fhx1;x2;0;y;z;0i 2 R6
+j 
 + x1  z  x1g:
(4.17)
T1 and T2 are valid IPT and BPT, respectively. We again focus on the structures of those
restrictions of the IPT and BPT that are non-empty.47 The fact that the smoke aects the






T2, which can be derived in a
straightforward way.
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intended production of electricity implies that Assumption (a) of Theorem 4 is violated in
this example:






2   yg and








(4.18) shows that the production of electricity is not independent of the level of smoke
produced. The restriction PT1(x1;x2;z) shrinks as z increases. However, the structure of
PT2(x1;x2;y) shows that the production of smoke is not (directly) aected by the level of
electricity produced (in nature, smoke is caused by the burning of coal):
PT2(x1;x2;y) = fz 2 R+j 
 + x1  z  x1g and
PT2(x1;x2;z) = R+:
(4.19)
(4.19) demonstrates that Assumption (b) of Theorem 4 holds for this example. Dene
T := T(T1;T2). We now study the properties of the observed technology T.





T2; Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show that,





PT(x1;x2) = PT1(x1;x2) \ PT2(x1;x2)
= fhz;yi 2 R2






2   z ^ 
 + x1  z  x1g
(4.20)






2  x1. Hence, from (3.13) it follows that
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y







2  x1g: (4.21)
The functions g : 
T ! R+,  g : 
T ! R+, and fy : 
y
T ! R+ are obtained as48
g(x1;x2;y) := minfz 2 R+j z 2 PT(x1;x2;y)g
= minfz 2 R+j z 2 PT1(x1;x2;y) \ PT2(x1;x2;y)g






2   y ^ 
 + x1  z  x1g = x1
 g(x1;x2;y) = minf
















Note that although, PT(x1;x2;y) inherits its structure from both the IPT and the BPT, g()
inherits its properties only from the BPT. This is because the lower bound on PT1(x1;x2;y)
is zero for all hx1;x2;yi 2 
T1. Thus, g() is increasing in the usage of the emission causing
48 Note, 













2  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 + x1  z  x1g:
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input of coal and it is independent of the level of electricity produced.49  g inherits its
properties from both the underlying IPT and BPT. fy() inherits its property only from
the IPT, as y does not aect the nature's BPT. fy() is increasing in both the inputs. But,
it is decreasing in z (see Figure 3(b)). This is because, in this example, smoke adversely
aects the intended production of electricity.50 Thus, T violates (v) in the denition of
(BP). Note, however, that it satises (i) to (iii) in the denition of (BP), hence, it satises
(WBP). Also, from (4.18) and (4.19) it follows that PT(x1;x2;z) = PT1(x1;x2;z) and
the structure of PT1(x1;x2;z) in (4.18) shows that T satises (ROFD){electricity is freely
disposable. Figure 3(b) also shows that T satises (CDB). Note that
PT(y;z) = fhx1;x2i 2 R2
+j
y2









which demonstrates that T violates input free-disposability with respect to coal but satis-
es the same with respect to labor.
The restriction of the technology PT(x1;x2) for hx1;x2i 2 
y
T is seen in Figure 3(b).
It is clear from this gure that the functional representation of T is







2  x1 ^ x1  z  minf













2   x1   zg
(4.24)
and that the correspondence Py() is single valued with image






2   x1i; 8 hx1;x2i 2 
y
T: (4.25)
Thus, all conclusions of Theorem 6 hold for this example.
4.4. Example 4 (leguminous plants in agriculture): An output as a source of emission and
a positive emission externality on intended production.
Consider a farmer who produces, as his intended outputs, a leguminous crop (y1)
such as peas, beans, lentils, etc. and a non-leguminous crop (y2) such as rice employing
the inputs of labor (x1) and nitrogenous fertilizer. The nitrogenous fertilizer is obtained
as a by-product (z) that is produced by his leguminous crop.51 Thus, in this example, z
imposes a positive externality on intended production. m = 2, m1 = 1, n = 1, n1 = 0,
and the IPT and BPT are
T1 = fhx;y1;y2;0;0;0;zi 2 R7
+j y1  x
1
2z   y2g and
T2 = fhx;y1;y2;0;0;z;0i 2 R7
+j 
 + y1  z  y1g;
(4.26)
49 Figure 3(b) veries this for given values of all inputs.
50 As noted above, this example violated Assumption (a) of Theorem 4.
51 Leguminous plants are highly desirable crops in agriculture, as they have the ability to x atmospheric
nitrogen, due to a symbiotic relationship with bacteria (rhizobia) found in root nodules of these plants.
The ability to form this symbiosis reduces fertilizer costs for farmers and gardeners who grow legumes,
and allows legumes to be used in a crop rotation to replenish soil that has been depleted of nitrogen.
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from which we can derive T = T(T1;T2). The various projections of the IPT and BPT
can be dened as before. Here we study the structures of various restrictions of the IPT
and BPT, whenever these restrictions are non-empty. The restrictions






PT2(x;y1;y2) = fz 2 R+j 
 + y1  z  y1g
(4.27)
show that Assumption (a) of Theorem 4 is violated by this example. Moreover, both these
restrictions impose non-trivial lower bounds on the emission.52 Hence, the function g()
inherits properties from both the IPT and the BPT. However, PT1(x;y1;y2) imposes no







 g(x;y1;y2) = 
 + y1:
(4.28)
The structures of the following restrictions, show that Assumption (b) of Theorem 4
holds for this example:
PT1(x;y1;z) = fy1 2 R+j y2  x
1
2z   y1g and
PT2(x;y1;z) = R+;
(4.29)
Hence f2(), the maximum amount of the non-emission generating non-leguminous crop,
inherits its properties only from the IPT:
f2(x;y1;z) = x
1
2z   y1: (4.30)
Each of the following restrictions has a well-dened upper bound.
PT1(x;y2;z) = fy1 2 R+j y1  x
1
2z   y2g and









Thus f1(), the emission generating leguminous crop, inherits its properties from both the







The upper bounds of both restrictions in (4.31) are increasing in z.53 This shows that
f1() is increasing in z. Hence, it violates the monotonicity properties of part (v) in the
denition of (BP). Hence T violates (BP). However, it satises (WBP). (4.31) shows that
52 PT1(x;y1;y2) shows that there is a minimal amount of nitrogen required to produce xed levels of
both intended crops when labor input is also held xed.
53 This is because z imposes a positive externality on intended production and z is caused by y1 in
nature's BPT.
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T violates free disposability of the leguminous crop. But (4.29) shows that T satises the
free disposability of the non-leguminous crop, i.e., (ROFD) holds. (4.27) and (4.28) show
that T satises (CDB). Further, since the BPT is unaected by labor,






shows that T satises free-disposability of labor. Thus, conclusions of Theorem 6 hold.
Figure 4(a) shows that the restriction
PT(x;y2) = PT1(x;y2) \ PT2(x;y2)
= fhz;y1i 2 R2
+j y1  x
1
2z   y2 ^ 
 + y1  z  y1g
(4.34)






.54 Figure 4(b) show that the restriction
PT(x;y1) = PT1(x;y1) \ PT2(x;y1)
= fhz;y2i 2 R2
+j y2  x
1
2z   y1 ^ 
 + y1  z  y1g
(4.35)





.55 In this example, f1() and g() are inverses of one
another. Figure 4(a) demonstrates this. Figure 4(b) shows that the graphs of g() and f2()
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54 This inequality denes 1
T.
55 This inequality denes 2
T.
56 This is unlike the case where T satises (BP).
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5. The marginal abatement cost of emissions: the by-production approach.
In this section we focus on technologies that satisfy (BP) and show that the by-
production approach to modeling technologies which generate emissions allows us to clearly
distinguish between and delineate all options that are available to rms for reducing/
abating the generation of emissions. In particular, for a xed technology, generation of
emissions can be reduced by any emission generating rm if it (i) increases the amounts of
resources that it diverts towards cleaning up (emission-mitigation) activities, i.e., increases
c, or (ii) reduces the use of inputs that cause emissions, i.e., reduces x1, or (iii) reduces the
production of intended outputs that cause pollution, i.e., reduces y1, or (iv) substitutes
away from inputs that are more intensive in producing the emissions to relatively cleaner
(or perfectly clean) inputs. It is usually felt that all such changes in production strategies
are costly in terms of the rm's resources. Here, we model two types of cost{technical cost
of abatement and the economic cost of abatement. The former is dened as the reduction
in the intended output of the rm when the rm reduces its emission, while the latter refers
to the loss in prots of the rm when it reduces its emission. Emission reduction can also
be achieved by technological changes that increase the productivity of inputs (especially,
the cleaner inputs) of intended production or the eectiveness of cleaning-up options of
rms.
5.1. Nature's emission generating industry and a simple model of by-production.
The nature's BPT (EGT)57 is governed by certain universal laws, namely, the physical
and chemical reactions which relate the level of emissions to the amounts of inputs and
intended outputs that produce these emissions.58 Hence, it is perhaps reasonable to assume
that these laws are common to all rms. In other words, it is as if there is an emission
generating industry dened by nature where (a) each rm in this industry has the same
EGT, (b) entry of new rms into this industry does not change the aggregate technology
of this industry, i.e., the laws of nature governing emission generation apply at both rm-
specic and aggregate levels, and (c) every rm necessarily enters this industry the moment
it uses or produces goods in its intended production that trigger o the laws of nature
that govern emission generation.
If the emission generating mechanism is viewed in this light, then it implies that the
underlying EGT is additive: if there are L rms indexed by l then (i) the EGT is common
to all rms, i.e.,
T l
2 = T2  R
n+2(m+2)
+ ; 8 l = 1;:::;L; (5.1)
57 Evocatively, in this section, we will call a by-product producing technology (BPT) an emission gen-
erating technology (EGT).
58 For example, the extent to which a given volume of coal can produce smoke can be thought of as a
relation determined by nature.
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and (ii) the aggregate technology of nature's emission generating industry is the same as




2 = T2: (5.2)
One candidate for such an EGT is an EGT that exhibits constant returns to scale. In
the following sections we assume a linear structure for the EGT. This ensures that the
EGT is additive. However, the linear structure rules out all second-order eects of changes
in emission causing inputs and outputs on emission generation{we are not sure of these
properties of nature's laws of emission generation and hence suppress them in the analysis
below. We rely only on the standard assumptions made in the literature regarding intended
production to unravel the properties of the abatement costs of emission generating rms.
We study a simple model where the rm produces a single output y and a single
emission z. It also undertakes cleaning-up eorts c. It employs three inputs, x1; x2; and
x3. In nature, emissions are potentially caused by x1 and x2.59 The IPT and the EGT
have the following forms:
T1 = fhx1;x2;x3;y;0;c;0;0;zi 2 R9
+j y  F(x1;x2;x3;c)g
T2 = fhx1;x2;x3;0;y;0;c;z;0i 2 R9
+j z  1x1 + 2x2   cg:
(5.3)
Let T(T1;T2)  Rn+m+2
+ be a technology in the empirically observed space that is derived
from (5.3). We assume that F() is concave and smooth in the interior of its domain. The
derivatives of F() satisfy Fc() < 0, Fi() > 0 for i = 1;:::;3, and Fi;c() = 0 for i = 1;2.
These sign restrictions capture the fact that the marginal productivities of all inputs
are positive in intended production and that production of cleaning-up activities is not
intensive in inputs x1 and x2.60 The production of cleaning-up activities is, however, costly
in terms of a rm's resources: x3 is a common input that is shared between the production
of y and the production of c. It is not the cause of emissions in nature. A greater amount
of x3 facilitates both an increase in production of the intended output and a reduction in
emissions. In our analysis, however, we wish to focus purely on those abatement strategies
of rms that potentially involve a trade-o between intended production and emission
reduction. For this purpose we restrict our analysis to abatement strategies of rms which
involve no change in the level of the third input, i.e., the level of this input will be
held xed. This implies that dierent abatement strategies of rms will generally involve
dierent distributions of the xed amount of input three between the production of y and
the production of c. We will assume throughout the next two sections that the rm always
59 In the next section, we interpret these as two fuel inputs used by the rm which produce energy.
60 The simple models we study are only illustrative examples to study the issue of abatement costs
employing the by-production approach. The assumption Fi;c() = 0 for i = 1;2 can of course be generalized
if this assumption is empirically false. However, in that case, many of the derivatives of the marginal
abatement cost function that we obtain below will have ambiguous signs. Assuming Fi;c() = 0 is convenient
and leads to denitive signs for these derivatives which are consistent with views in the literature or are
intuitively meaningful.
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operates in a technically ecient manner, that is, its choice of the production vectors
hx1;x2;x3;y;c;zi 2 R6
+ are such that
y = F(x1;x2;x3;c)
z = 1x1 + 2x2   c:
(5.4)
5.2. The marginal technical cost of abatement (MTCA) and its properties.
In this section, we interpret the simple model above to be the model of a technol-
ogy that is energy intensive. Inputs one and two are two sources of energy. These two
have dierent abilities to produce the energy input, in addition to the dierences in their
propensities to generate emissions. Thus, in this section, the function F() is assumed to
have the following form:
F(x1;x2;x3;c) = f(e(x1;x2);x3;c): (5.5)
Here, we interpret e() as the aggregator function that species the total energy input
obtained from employing x1 and x2 amounts, respectively, of inputs one and two. Let us
make a further simplifying assumption:
e(x1;x2) = 1x1 + 2x2 (5.6)
with 1 > 2, i.e., input one is more productive in energy production than input two. At
the same time, we also assume that 1 > 2, i.e., input 1 has a greater propensity to
generate emissions that input two.  measures the eectiveness of the cleaning-up eorts
of the rm in reducing emissions. We assume  > 0, 1 > 0, and 2  0. If 2 = 0
then input 2 is a perfectly clean input (has no impurities) and hence is not a source of
emission even though it is a source of energy input for the rm. Thus, in this case n2 = 2
and n1 = 1.61 On the other hand, if 2 > 0, then n1 = 2 and n2 = 1.62 Technological
developments in cleaner methods for producing intended outputs increase the value of
2, that is, make the clean(er) input more productive in producing energy for intended
production. Technological development can also improve the eectiveness of cleaning-up
methods used by the rm, i.e., increase the value of . We assume, however, that 1 and
2 are dened by nature. The derivatives of f() satisfy fe() > 0, f3() > 0, fc() < 0, and
fe;c() = 0.
In this simple model, the dierent abatement options open to a rm include cleaning-
up activities, reduction in the usage of inputs (fuel-inputs) that cause emissions, and
switching between inputs (inter-fuel substitution) that vary in terms of their emission gen-
erating propensities. Starting at an initial ecient production vector h x1;  x2;  x3;  y; c;  zi 2
R6
+, an abatement strategy of the rm is assumed to be a linear path of inputs and
61 Examples of such inputs include wind, solar, or hydro power to generate energy.
62 Example of such an input is a cleaner variety of coal that has less carbon content, and hence, is less
productive in energy generation, while at the same time has a smaller propensity to generate emissions.
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x1(t) =  x1 + _ x1t
x2(t) =  x2 + _ x2t
c(t) =  c + _ ct
3
5 (5.7)
Denote the gradient of  with respect to t by rt. Then, (5.7) indicates that
rt(t) = [ _ x1 _ x2 _ c] =: _ : (5.8)
Each linear path (t) involves a particular mix of rates of change in x1, x2, and c. Note,
(0) = h x1;  x2; ci and, for a given technology, dierent values of _ x1, _ x2, and _ c coincide with
dierent paths (dierent strategies) of abatement undertaken by the rm. We restrict our
analysis to linear paths (t) for which k _  k= 1.63 _  is thus a direction of change in all
inputs and cleaning-up eorts of a rm, starting from an initial production vector.
The path of production of the intended output and emissions induced by any path
(t) of inputs and explicit abatement is
y = f(1x1(t) + 2x2(t);  x3;c(t))
 z    =  z   (t) := 1x1(t) + 2x2(t)   c(t)
(5.9)
so that z(0) =  z, (0) = 0, and y(0) =  y. (t) is the total abatement (the change/
reduction) in the emissions from the initial level  z. From (5.9) it follows that
 z   (t) = 1x1(t) + 2x2(t)   c(t)
) z   (t) = 1[ x1 + _ x1t] + 2[ x2 + _ x2t]   [ c + _ ct]
) z   (t) =  z + [1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2   _ c]t
)   (t) = [1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2   _ c]t:
(5.10)
From (5.10) it follows that starting from an initial production vector, abatement is in-
creasing along the path (t) if
@(t)
@t
=  [1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2   _ c] > 0: (5.11)
In that case, the function (t) is invertible and (5.10) implies
t =
 
1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2   _ c
: (5.12)







1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2   _ c
];  x3;  c +
 _ c
1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2   _ c
 (5.13)
63 k _  k= 1 denotes the Euclidean norm of _  2 R3.
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We dene the technical cost of abatement function CT : R8
+ ! R+ with image
CT(;1;2;;  x1;  x2;  x3; c) = f
 








1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2   _ c
];  x3;  c +
 _ c




CT() is the change in intended output from the initial level  y due to any linear path (t)
of inputs and cleaning-up eort chosen by the rm, that results in a path (t) of total
abatement.
In the context of the model described above, for any given path of abatement chosen
by a rm, we derive the marginal technical cost of abatement (MTCA) and study its
properties. Our aim is two-fold: (i) to study the properties of MTCA along any path of
abatement adopted by the rm and (ii) given any path of abatement adopted by a rm, to
study the eect of changes in technology and the dierences in the initial levels of usage
of inputs and the initial cleaning-up eorts on MTCA. Along any such path, the marginal
technical cost of abatement is given by the derivative:
@CT(;1;2;;  x1;  x2;  x3; c)
@
 CT
(;1;2;;  x1;  x2;  x3; c)
=
fe()[1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2] + fc() _ c
1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2   _ c
:
(5.15)
To see how the marginal technical cost of abatement varies with the abatement level along






fe;e() [1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2]2 + fc;c()_ c2
[1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2   _ c]2 ; (5.16)
Similarly, we can also study how the marginal technical cost of abatement varies with
the initial levels of inputs one and two, the initial level of cleaning-up eorts of the rm,





1 fe;e() [1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2]






2 fe;e() [1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2]













[1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2]
2_ cfe;e() + _ c3fc;c()   _ c[1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2   _ c]
2rCT()
[1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2   _ c]
3 ;
(5.17)
64 Recall, fe;c() = 0.





x2()fe;e()[1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2] + fe()_ x2






x1()fe;e()[1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2] + fe()_ x1
1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2   _ c
:
(5.18)
Consider, rst, three obvious paths of abatement reductions that are available to a
rm:
(1) ceteris-paribus, reduction in the energy intensive inputs: (t) such that _ c = 0, _ x1 
0; _ x2  0, and h_ x1; _ x2i 6= 0,
(2) ceteris paribus, a switch from the more emission generating to the less emission gen-
erating input (inter-fuel substitution): (t) such that _ c = 0 and _ x1 =  _ x2 and _ x2 > 0,
and
(3) ceteris paribus, an increase in it cleaning up eorts: (t) such that _ c > 0; _ x1 = _ x2 = 0.
From (5.11) it follows that, along all the three paths above, abatement is increasing:
1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2   _ c < 0: (5.19)
Theorem 7: : Along paths 1 to 3 of abatement,
(i) CT
(;1;2;;  x1;  x2; c) > 0,
(ii) CT
;(;1;2;;  x1;  x2; c) > 0,
(iii) CT
; xi(;1;2;;  x1;  x2; c) < 0; 8 i = 1;2,
(iv) CT
; c(;1;2;;  x1;  x2; c) > 0, and
(v) CT
;(;1;2;;  x1;  x2; c) < 0.
Along path 2 of abatement,
(vi) CT
;2(;1;2;;  x1;  x2; c) < 0 and
(vii) the sign of CT
;1(;1;2;;  x1;  x2; c) is ambiguous.
Along path 1 of abatement,
(viii) the sign of CT
;i(;1;2;;  x1;  x2; c) for i = 1;2 is ambiguous.the signs
Proof: Follows from (5.19), (5.15), (5.16), (5.18), and our (standard) curvature and mono-
tonicity assumptions on the intended production function f().
This result is quite intuitive: Along all the three paths of abatement above, the
MTCA is positive ((i) of Theorem 7) because along all these paths, abatement comes
at the cost of reduction of the intended output{this is either because it entails, ceteris
paribus, a reduction in some inputs or because, ceteris paribus, a greater diversion of the
xed amount of input three from the production of y to the production of c or because,
ceteris paribus, a substitution from an input that is more productive in intended production
to a relatively less productive input.
Along all the three paths of abatement above, MTCA is increasing in the level of
abatement ((ii) of Theorem 7) because of diminishing returns to resources in intended
production. Abatement path 1 implies that, ceteris paribus, as the fuel intensive inputs
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are reduced more and more, the loss in intended output increases due to the phenomenon
of diminishing returns to these inputs (fe;e() < 0). Abatement path 2 implies that, ceteris
paribus, as more and more inter-fuel substitution takes place towards the fuel that is less
energy intensive, the energy input into intended input falls, diminishing returns to energy
kicks in, and the loss in intended output increases; abatement path 3 implies that, ceteris
paribus, as the rm undertakes more and more cleaning-up activities c, more and more
of the xed input x3 is diverted away from production of y. Diminishing returns to this
input in the production of c implies that more and more of the intended output has to be
given up to produce more and more of c (fc;c() < 0)).
Along paths 1 and 2 of abatement above, MTCA is (non-trivially) decreasing in the
initial amounts of each of the energy-generating inputs ((iii) of Theorem 7): marginal
costs of rms employing higher amounts of the emission generating inputs is lower. This
is again due to the phenomenon of diminishing returns in intended production: at higher
levels of usage of fuel inputs, the marginal productivities of these inputs is lower. Hence,
for these rms, ceteris paribus, a reduction in the usage of these inputs or a switch to the
relatively less energy intensive input implies a smaller reduction in the intended output
than for rms which are employing lower amounts of these inputs,
Along path 3 of abatement above, MTCA is increasing in the initial amount of
cleaning-up eorts ((iv) of Theorem 7): MTCAs of rms engaging in higher amounts
of the cleaning-up activities is higher. This is because rms for which  c is higher, the
marginal productivity of inputs in producing cleaning-up output is lower due to dimin-
ishing returns, and hence, ceteris paribus, an increase in c requires a greater diversion of
input three from y to c for these rms than for rms whose initial levels of cleaning-up is
lower.
Along all the three paths of abatement above, MTCA is decreasing in the eectiveness
 of cleaning-up eort of a rm in reducing emissions ((v) of Theorem 7). As  increases,
smaller reductions in fuel inputs or lesser switching to the less productive fuel input or
smaller increases in the amounts of cleaning-up eorts are required to generate a given
amount of abatement . Hence, diminishing returns implies lower reductions in intended
outputs for rms with higher values of .
Along path 2 of abatement above, MTCA is decreasing in the productivity of energy
input x2: marginal abatement costs of rms with higher 2 is lower or as 2 increases with
technological development, MTCAs fall. There are two eects on MTCA of an increase in
2; (a) holding the marginal product of energy input xed, an increase in 2 implies that the
decrease in the energy input due to inter-fuel substitution towards the less fuel intensive
input is lower and (b) holding the decrease in energy input due to inter-fuel substitution
xed, an increase in 2, ceteris paribus, implies a higher amount of the energy input,
and hence, decreases the marginal productivity of the energy input due to diminishing
returns. On the other hand, along path 1 (_ x2 < 0) of abatement above, nothing can be
said about how the MTCA will change due to an increase in 2: an argument similar to
(b) above holds but (a) may not along this path of abatement. Similarly, we can explain
the remaining parts of Theorem 7.
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Starting from any initial production vector, the by-production approach to modeling
technologies that generate emissions also shows the existence of abatement strategies which
lead to both higher abatement levels and lower reductions in output. This is possible, for
example, when at the initial production vectors dierences exist in the marginal rates
of technical substitutions between energy generating inputs in emission reductions and
intended production, i.e., 1
2 6= 1
2 .
Theorem 8: Let h x1;  x2;  x3;  y; c;  zi 2 R6
+ be an initial production vector such that
 y = f(1 x1 + 2 x2;  x3; c)
 z = 1 x1 + 2 x2    c:
(5.20)





1 fe( x1; x2; x3; c);
fc( x1; x2; x3; c) 6= 1
 .
Then there exist paths of abatement (t) associated with directions of change _  = h_ x1; _ x2; _ ci
such that MTCA is negative, that is, rC() < 0.
Proof: (i) If 1
2 > 1
2, then choose _ c = 0, _ x1 = 1 and _ x2 < 0 such that  1




2, then choose _ c = 0, _ x1 =  1 and _ x2 > 0 such that 1
2 < _ x2 < 1
2. In both cases,
we nd that 1 _ x1 + 2 _ x2 > 0 and 1 _ x1 + 2 + _ x2 < 0 and, hence, rC() < 0.
(ii) Similar to proof of part (i).
This result is also intuitive. When 1
2 > 1
2, then for a given increase in the usage of
fuel input x1, the maximum that the rm is willing to give up of fuel input x2 to ensure
at least the original level of intended output y is greater than the minimum amount of
fuel input x2 that it needs to give up to ensure at least the original level of abatement .
Thus, any decrease in usage of fuel input x2 that lies between these two bounds implies
both an increase in intended output and a greater reduction of emissions.65
5.3. The marginal economic cost of abatement (MECA).
Assuming that a rm maximizes prots, what is the loss in its prots when it is subject
to an environmental regulation that requires it to reduce its emission? We dene this loss
as the rm's economic cost of abatement. We employ the technological specications
in (5.3). Let hpy;p1;p2;p3i 2 R4
+ be a vector of output and input prices faced by the
65 The derivates in (5.18) can be used also to understand how the MTAC will vary along a path of rm
characteristics, starting from an initial conguration of rm characteristics h x1;  x2; c;;1;2i 2 R6
++.
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rm. The prot function of a rm with technology T(T1;T2)  Rn+m+2
+ is derived as the
mapping  : R7
+ ! R+ with image
( z;;py;p1;p2;p3;  x3) := maxpyy  
2 X
i=1
pixi   p3 x3
subject to
y  F(x1;x2;  x3;c) and





The Lagrangian of this problem is
L() = pyy  
2 X
i=1
pixi   p3 x3   [y   F(x1;x2;  x3;c)]   [
2 X
i=1
ixi   c    z + ]; (5.22)
where  2 R and  2 R are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints imposed by
the IPT and the BPT, respectively. Note, given the inequalities that characterize the
constraints in (5.21), at the optimum, they will necessarily be non-negative.
The initial level of prots prior is dened as the value ( z;;py;p1;p2;p3;  x3) when
 = 0. We denote this by  . We dene the economic cost of abatement as the reduction
in the initial level of prots due to abatement constraints. The economic cost function is
the mapping: CE : R7
+ ! R+ with image
CE( z;;py;p1;p2;p3;  x3) :=     ( z;;py;p1;p2;p3;  x3): (5.23)
The marginal economic cost of abatement (MECA) is thus the derivative of CE() with
respect to . Employing the envelope theorem, from (5.22), it follows that it takes the
form
rCE() 
@CE( z;;py;p1;p2;p3;  x3)
@
=  
@( z;;py;p1;p2;p3;  x3)
@
= ( z;;py;p1;p2;p3;  x3)  0:
(5.24)
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We will now study how MECA varies with the level of abatement and the initial level
of emission. To do so, we employ standard comparative static methods. The rst-order
conditions of the problem (5.21) are
py    = 0;
  p1 + F1()   1 = 0;
  p2 + F2()   2 = 0;
Fc() +  = 0;
y   F(x1;x2;  x3;c) = 0; and
2 X
i=1
ixi   c    z +  = 0:
(5.26)
Let the rst-order conditions in (5.26) be represented by the vector-valued implicit function
G(y;x1;x2;c;;;  z;;p1;p2;p3;  x3) = 0; (5.27)
where hy;x1;x2;c;;i 2 R6
+ are the endogenous variables and h z;;p1;p2;p3;  x3i 2
R6
+ are the exogenous variables. Focusing only on the comparative statics of the choice
variables with respect to  and dierentiating (5.27) we obtain
ry;x1;x2;c;;G() 
2









7 7 7 7 7 7
5
=  rG()  d; (5.28)
where ry;x1;x2;c;;G() and rG() are the Jacobians
ry;x1;x2;c;;G() =
2
6 6 6 6 6
6
4
0 0 0 0  1 0
0 F1;1() F1;2() 0 F1()  1
0 F1;2() F2;2() 0 F2()  2
0 0 0 Fc;c() Fc() 
1  F1()  F2()  Fc() 0 0
0 1 2   0 0
3




















Employing the implicit function theorem, from (5.28) we can solve for the following local
derivatives: 2
6 6 6 6
















7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7
5
= [ry;x1;x2;c;;G()] 1rG() (5.30)
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1   212F1;2] + 22[F1;1F2;2   F2
1;2]
: (5.35)
Theorem 9: If, in addition to the maintained assumptions,















> 0; and (5.36)
















Proof: (1) follows in a straightforward manner given all the assumptions on F(). (2)
follows from the fact that for i;i0 = 1;2, Fi() = ife() and Fi;i0() = ii0fe;e(). In particular,
note that, in this case, we have F1;2() < 0, F1;1()F2;2()   F2
1;2() = 0, and
@x1()




Corollary to Theorem 9: If, in addition to the maintained assumptions, F() satises
conditions in (1) of Theorem 9 then
@2CE()
@2 > 0 and
@2CE()
@ z@ < 0: If, in addition to the main-




@ z@ = 0:
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Proof: Follows from (5.25).
If the rm is a price taker and is mandated to reduce its initial level of emission, then
it will (endogenously) choose that path of abatement that maximizes its prots. Along
such a path, in general, the signs of the derivatives in (5.31) to (5.35) depend on the sign
of F1;2(). If this is negligible or non-negative then part (1) of Theorem 9 says that, along
the optimal path of abatement chosen by the rm, the rm meets its mandated abatement
requirement by reducing the use of both its fuel inputs and increasing its cleaning-up
eorts. Hence, along this path, its output will fall. The corollary to Theorem 9 says
that, along this path, MECA of the rm increases with increase in abatement, while it
decreases with increase in the initial level of emissions, a phenomenon which again invokes
the economic law of diminishing returns. If, however, F() assumes the form in (5.5) and
(5.6), then part (2) and the corollary of Theorem 9 say that, along the optimal path chosen
by the rm, MECA is constant and the rm meets its abatement requirements purely by
adopting the inter-fuel substitution strategy. Reduction in emission is achieved by no
change in its output or cleaning-up eort.
6. Conclusions.
Emissions generated by rms are by-products of their intended production. In the intro-
ductory section we presented ve acceptable attributes of the process of emission generation
by rms. A concept of by-production was dened. We showed that technologies of rms
that satisfy this condition possess all the ve attributes and that any technology that
satises the Murty and Russell [2010] characterization{i.e., is derived as an intersection
of two distinct technologies, one capturing the production relations between inputs and
outputs in intended production and other capturing the production relations underlying
nature's emission generating mechanism{satises by-production. While intended produc-
tion could be postulated to satisfy standard input and output free-disposability, these will
necessarily be violated by nature's emission generation mechanism, which satises costly
disposability of emission as dened in Murty [2010]. We showed that the Murty and
Russell [2010] characterization is also necessary for by-production. This is because, when
by-production holds, the lower bound on emissions and the upper bounds on intended
outputs provide two production relations that describe such technologies. It was shown
that, under by-production, these two relations are distinct: the upper-bounds are dened
by the relations that govern intended production and the lower bounds are dened by the
relations in nature regarding emission generation. These two relations can be used to re-
cover the underlying intended production technology and nature's by-product generating
technology. By-production however precludes external eects that emissions generated
by a rm can impose on its own intended production. When such external eects are
allowed then our examples showed that the technologies may violate some of the expected
correlations between emission generation and intended production.
By allowing us to distinguish between and model details about production relations
that underlie intended production and the nature's laws regarding emission generation,
the by-production approach provides a very rich framework for studying rms' costs of
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abatement when they are mandated to reduce emissions. It is not possible to obtain
such details regarding abatement costs under existing formulations of emission generating
technologies, which are mostly in reduced-form. The importance of marginal abatement
costs for environmental policy cannot be over-stated.
The by-production approach allows us to delineate all options that are available to
rms for reducing emissions. In the simple model that we studied, such options include
reductions in fuel inputs, inter-fuel substitution, cleaning-up eorts such as auent treat-
ment plants, or technological progress that improves productivity of inputs (especially
clean inputs) or improves the eectiveness of rms' cleaning-up eorts. We distinguished
between technical costs and economic costs of abatement. While, the former was expressed
purely in terms of the technology and considered the loss in intended outputs due to man-
dated reductions in emissions, the latter was dened in the context of economic behavior
of rms. It considered loss in maximum prots of rms when they are faced with envi-
ronmental regulation. We showed that the properties of marginal abatement costs can
be explained purely in terms of known economic laws such as \diminishing returns" in
intended production.
Though some intuitively obvious abatement strategies implied that marginal techni-
cal abatement costs are increasing in abatement, it was also seen that, as long as there
are dierences in the marginal rates of technical substitutions between goods in intended
production and nature's emission producing mechanism, there also always exist strategies
that involve both greater reductions in emissions and greater production of intended out-
puts. This is true, for example, when the marginal rate of technical substitution between
two fuel inputs in producing an intended output is dierent from the marginal rate of
technical substitution between these inputs in producing emissions. If such abatement
strategies are not adopted by rms, then it must purely be due to the fact that they
are not protable{presumably because of the input costs underlying them. When man-
dated to reduce emissions, prot maximizing rms internalize the nature's by-production
technology and endogenously choose their optimal abatement strategy.
Marginal abatement costs of rms also vary depending on the characteristics of a
rm. Our model illustrated cases where marginal economic cost of abatement decreases
with increase in the initial level of emission{rms with higher initial levels of emissions have
lower marginal abatement costs. This is because of their higher use of emission causing
inputs or lower cleaning-up eorts. As a result, the law of diminishing returns implies that
their loss in intended outputs due to increase in abatement will be lower than for rms
with lower initial levels of emissions.
Our simple model for studying costs of abatement is only an illustrative example.
More complex models capturing more detailed aspects of both intended production and
nature's laws of emission generation can be studied by employing the by-production ap-
proach. Properties of abatement cost may dier across dierent technological specica-
tions.
The rm-level analysis here can perhaps be carried over to a global level with coun-
tries as the units of analysis. Inferences can be made about the division of reductions
in emissions between countries based on eciency considerations, which usually involve
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dierences in marginal abatement costs between countries based on their initial levels of
emissions, use of fuel inputs, and cleaning-up eorts such as carbon sequestration eorts
etc.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1: (1) We prove the result for Pj().  Pj() can be similarly proved.
Suppose hyj;zi 2 Pj(x;y j;c) and h yj;  zi 2 Pj(x;y j;c) with hyj;zi 6= h yj;  zi. Thus
yj = fj(x;y j;c;z) ^  yj = fj(x;y j;c;  z)
z = g(x;y j;c;z) ^  z = g(x;y j;c;z)
(A.1)
hyj;zi 6= h yj;  zi implies yj 6=  yj or z 6=  z. Suppose yj 6=  yj. Then the rst part of (A.1)
is in contradiction with part (b) of (v) in the denition of (BP). If  z 6= z then the second
part of (A.1) is in contradiction with part (b) of (iv) in the denition of (BP).
(2) follows from part (a) of both (iv) and (v) in the denition of (BP).
Proof of Theorem 2:
(1) Suppose T satises (BP), (OFD), (IFD), and m1 = 0. Part (a) of (iv) in the de-
nition of (BP) implies that there exist hx;y;c;zi 2 T,  x1  x1 and  c  c such that
h x1; ci 6= hx1;ci and g(x;y;c) < g( x1;x2;y; c). T satises (OFD) and (IFD) implies
h x1;x2;y; c;zi 2 T. Let  z = g( x1;x2;y; c) and ^ z = g(x;y;c). Then  z > ^ z and
hx;y;c; ^ zi 2 T. Therefore, h x1;x2;y; c; ^ zi 62 T. A contradiction to T satises (OFD)
and (IFD).
(2) Suppose T satises (BP) and (2) in the statement of the theorem holds. Then z :=
 g(x;y;c) >  g(x;  y1;y2;c) =:  z and hx;y;c;zi 2 T. However, z = 2 PT(x;  y1;y2;c) since
this set is bounded above by  z which is less than z. Hence, hx;  y1;y2;c;zi = 2 T.
Therefore, T does not satisfy (OFD).
Proof of Theorem 3: (1) Suppose T satises (BP) and (CDB) and suppose GT = F
j
T
for some j = m1 + 1;:::;m. Let yj = fj(x;y j;c;z). Then z = g(x;y;c). (CDB) implies
there exists ^ z > z such that hx;y j;yj;c; ^ zi 2 T. Part (b) of (v) in the denition of
(BP) implies yj = fj(x;y j;c; ^ z) so that hx;y;c; ^ zi 2 F
j
T. But g(x;y;c) = z < ^ z. Hence,
hx;y;c; ^ zi 62 GT. This is a contradiction to GT = F
j
T.
(2) Suppose T satises (BP) and (ROFD) and suppose GT = F
j
T for some j = m1 +
1;:::;m. Let yj = fj(x;y j;c;z). Then z = g(x;y;c). (ROFD) implies there exists
^ yj < yj such that hx;y j; ^ yj;c;zi 2 T. Part (b) of (iv) in the denition of (BP) implies
g(x;y j; ^ yj;c) = z so that hx;y j; ^ yj;c;zi 2 GT. But fj(x;y j;c;z) = yj > ^ yj. Hence,
hx;y j; ^ yj;c;zi 62 F
j
T. This is a contradiction to GT = F
j
T.
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and (A.3) implies that




(A.2), (A.5), and part (a) of (v) in the denition of (BP) implies that
yj = fj(x;y j;j0
;yj0;c;z)  fj(x;y j;j0
; ~ yj0;c;z): (A.6)
If yj > fj(x;y j;j0
; ~ yj0;c;z) then a contradiction to the second part of (A.5) arises. Hence,
(A.6) holds as
yj = fj(x;y j;j0
; ~ yj0;c;z): (A.7)
Proof of Theorem 4: T1 and T2 are closed implies that T is closed so (i) in the denition
of (BP) is satised for T.
For all j = 1;:::;m and for all hx;y j;c;zi 2 
j
T
PT(x;y j;c;z) :=fyj 2 R+j hx;y j;yj;c;zi 2 Tg
=fyj 2 R+j yj 2 PT1(x;y j;c;z) \ PT2(x;y j;c;z)g
fyj 2 R+j yj 2 PT1(x;y j;c;z)g;
(A.8)
which is bounded following (ii) in the denition of an IPT. So (ii) in the denition of (BP)
holds for T.
Assumption (a) of the theorem and (3.14) imply
g(x;y;c) :=minfz 2 R+j z 2 PT(x;y;c)g
=minfz 2 R+j z 2 R+ \ PT2(x;y;c)g
=GT2(x;y;c):
(A.9)
Part (a) of (iv) in the denition of a BPT implies that there exists hx;y;ci 2 
T such that
GT2(x;y;c) > 0. (A.9) hence imply that (iii) in the denition of (BP) holds for T.
Let hx;y;ci; h x;  y; ci 2 
T such that x1   x1; y1   y1; c   c and hx1;y1;ci 6= h x1;  y1; ci.
Then part (a) of (iv) in the denition of a BPT and (A.9) imply
g(x;y;c) = GT2(x;y;c)  GT2( x1;  x2;  y1;  y2; c) = g( x;  y; c) (A.10)
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Hence, part (a) of (iv) in the denition of (BP) holds for T.
Let hx;y;ci; h x;  y; ci 2 
T such that g(x;y;c) > g( x;  y; c). Then (A.9)implies that
GT2(x;y;c) > GT2( x;  y; c): (A.11)
(A.11) and part (b) of (iv) in the denition of a BPT imply that hx1;y1;ci 6= h x1;  y1; ci
and it is not the case that x1   x1, y1   y1, and c   c. This proves that part (b) of (iv)
in the denition of (BP) holds for T and similarly, we can prove that part (c) of (iv) in
the denition of a BPT implies part (c) of (iv) in the denition of (BP).
For j = m1 + 1;:::;m, it follows from (3.14) and Assumption (b) of the theorem that
fj(x;y j;c;z) :=maxfyj 2 R+j yj 2 P(x;y j;c;z)g





Let hx;y j;c;zi;h x;  y j; c;  zi 2 
j
T with x   x; y j   y j; and c   c. Then (A.12) and





T1( x;  y j; c;z): (A.13)
Assumption (a) of the theorem implies that
PT1( x;  y j; c;z) = PT1( x;  y j; c;  z) (A.14)





T1( x;  y j; c;z) = F
j
T1( x;  y j; c;  z) = fj( x;  y j; c;  z):
(A.15)
This shows that part (a) of (v) in the denition of (BP) holds for T.
For j = m1+1;:::;m, let hx;y j;c;zi;h x;  y j; c;  zi 2 
j
T and fj(x;y j;c;z) > fj( x;  y j; c;  z).





T1( x;  y j; c;  z)
= F
j
T1( x;  y j; c;z):
(A.16)
(A.16) and part (b) of Remark 1 imply that hx;y j;ci 6= h x;  y j; ci and it is not the case
that x   x; y j   y j; and c   c. This shows that part (b) of (v) in the denition of
(BP) holds for T.
T satises (CDB) follows from Assumption (a) of the theorem and the facts that T2
satises (iii) in the denition of a BPT, g() = GT2(), and  g() =  GT2(). T satises (RIFD)
and (ROFD) follow from Assumption (b) of the theorem and the fact that T1 satises (iii)
in the denition of a IPT.
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Proof of Theorem 5: (1) follows in an obvious manner and (2) follows once, given any





+ j 9 h x;  y j; ci 2 
j
T such that x   x ^ y j   y j







+ j hx;y j;ci 2 
j






+ and T2  R
n+2(m+2)
+ satisfy the denitions of an IPT and a BPT,
respectively and T = T(T1;T2).
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